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I. Introduction 
 
The conventional wisdom is that the Japanese and other Asians are penny pinchers and 
savers and that Americans and other Westerners are spendthrifts and borrowers, 
presumably due to differences in culture, belief systems, values, and religion (for 
example, the prevalence of Confucian teachings in Asia vs. the prevalence of Christian 
teachings in the West), but do the data bear out this conventional wisdom?  The 
purpose of this paper is to conduct an international comparison of the financial health of 
households and to shed light on whether the conventional wisdom is correct using data 
on household wealth (assets) and indebtedness (liabilities) from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on the Group of Seven (G7) 
countries (the world’s seven major industrialized countries: Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States).  I then analyze long-term 
trends over time in Japan and speculate about the causes of differences among countries 
and of long-term trends over time in Japan. 
 
Looking at previous analyses of this topic, the study that is closest in spirit to the 
present study is Horioka (2006), but it is also related to Gordon (2006, 2012), which 
explore the prevalence of consumer credit in Japan in comparison to the United States. 
 
To summarize my main findings, I find that the conventional wisdom that the Japanese 
and other Asians are penny pinchers and savers and that Americans and other 
Westerners are spendthrifts and borrowers appears at first glance to be mistaken.  The 
Japanese were the most prolific borrowers among the G7 countries, at least until 2000, 
whereas Americans were not unusually prolific borrowers.  However, what matters 
more than the level of liabilities is the level of liabilities relative to the level of assets, 
and the Japanese rank relatively high with respect to both total assets and net wealth 
(the most comprehensive measure of household wealth that takes account of both assets 
and liabilities and the best indicator of the financial health of households), while 
Americans rank relatively low with respect to both.  Thus, the Japanese are more 
frugal and healthier financially than Americans and most other Westerners, and the 
conventional wisdom is correct after all.  Turning to long-term trends over time in 
Japan, I find that Japan has shown a sharp increase over time in household borrowing, at 
least until 2000, and a sharp increase over time in both household assets and household 
net worth, at least until 1990.  It is not clear whether the greater financial health of 
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Japanese households is due more to culture or to government policies, institutions, and 
other non-cultural factors, but it appears that long-term trends over time in household 
assets, liabilities, and net worth in Japan can be explained much better by non-cultural 
factors than by culture. 
 
This paper is organized as follows:  In section II, I present data on household wealth 
and indebtedness for the G7 countries; in section III, I discuss long-term trends over 
time in Japan; and in section IV, I summarize my conclusions and speculate about the 
causes of differences among countries and of long-term trends over time in Japan. 
 
 
II. Data on Household Wealth and Indebtedness for the Group of Seven (G7) 
Countries 
 
In this section, I present data on household wealth and indebtedness (at the end of the 
calendar year) from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) on the Group of Seven (G7) countries (the world’s seven major industrialized 
countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States), taken from the OECD Economic Outlook, a semiannual publication of the 
OECD.   
 
Before turning to the results, I provide definitions of the various categories of wealth 
and indebtedness.  Household wealth or assets can be broken down into two broad 
categories: financial assets (consisting of bank and postal deposits, negotiable securities 
such as bonds and equities, life insurance, etc.) and non-financial assets (consisting 
mostly of land and housing). 
 
Similarly, household indebtedness or liabilities can be broken down into two broad 
categories: mortgages (housing loans) and all other liabilities.  However, this 
breakdown is not available in some countries (France and Italy), and in these countries, 
loans are broken down by the period of maturity (short- and medium-term loans vs. 
long-term loans in France and short-term loans vs. medium- and long-term loans in 
Italy).  For ease of exposition, I will use the term “mortgages (housing loans)” even 
when the data pertain to long-term or medium- and long-term loans and the term 
“non-housing loans” for all other liabilities, but the reader should bear in mind that the 
data on the breakdown of liabilities are not strictly comparable across countries. 
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Finally, I use two measures of household wealth that take account of both wealth 
(assets) and indebtedness (liabilities) since indebtedness (liabilities) should be regarded 
as a negative asset or as an offset to assets.  Net financial wealth is calculated as 
financial assets minus total liabilities, and net wealth (the broadest measure of 
household wealth and the best indicator of the financial health of households) is 
calculated as total assets minus total liabilities. 
 
Table 1 shows data on the ratios of these various categories of household wealth and 
household indebtedness to household disposable income for the G7 countries for the 
1980-2008 period (at 5-year intervals between 1980-2005 and also for 2008) except that 
data for 2007 are shown in cases in which data for 2008 are not yet available.  For ease 
of exposition, I will say “2008” even when the data pertain to 2007. 
 
A. Data on Household Indebtedness (Liabilities) 
 
I look first at data on household indebtedness (liabilities).  As can be seen from Table 1, 
what is at first surprising is that Japan (the only Asian country in the sample) ranks first 
with respect to the ratio of total liabilities to household disposable income in four of the 
seven years (1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000) and relatively high in the other years also 
(second in 1980 and 2005 and fourth in 2008).  This ratio ranged between 77 and 135 
percent in Japan during the 1980-2008 period, meaning that total liabilities exceeded 
household disposable income in most years! 
 
Americans are believed to be unusually prolific borrowers, but according to Table 1, 
Americans are only about average with respect to the ratio of total liabilities to 
household disposable income, ranking between second and fifth in all seven years for 
which data are shown, ranking below Japan in six of the seven years, and being tied 
with Japan in the remaining year (1980).  Thus, the conventional wisdom concerning 
Japan and the U.S. seems to be totally mistaken with the behavior of households in the 
two countries being the opposite of what it is purported to be.  
 
Looking at the other G7 countries, the ratio of total liabilities to household disposable 
income is relatively high in Canada and the United Kingdom, relatively low in France 
and Germany, and lowest by far in Italy, with this ratio ranging from only 8 to 72 
percent in Italy.  Thus, there is considerable variation even among the Western 
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countries, but virtually all of them rank below Japan with respect to the ratio of total 
liabilities to household disposable income. 
 
I look next at the two major components of household indebtedness 
(liabilities)—namely, mortgages (housing loans) and non-housing loans to see which is 
responsible for Japan’s surprisingly high liability-to-income ratio.  The data in Table 1 
show that the ratio of mortgages (housing loans) to household disposable income in 
Japan is near the bottom of the G7 countries (fifth or sixth in all seven years) and ranges 
from 31 to 65 percent. 
 
By contrast, the ratio of mortgages (housing loans) to household disposable income is 
near the top of the G7 countries (second in most years, third in one year, and fourth in 
one year) in the United States and ranges from 50 to 99 percent.  (Note parenthetically 
that this ratio increased sharply (by 30 percentage points!) during the 2000-05 period, 
presumably as a result of U.S. government policies to increase the availability of 
housing loans to the low-income, which precipitated the subprime-related financial 
crisis that spread from the United States to the world economy as a whole.) 
 
Thus, the relative rankings of Japan and the United States are reversed depending on 
whether one looks at total liabilities or mortgages (housing loans), which suggests that 
the relatively high ratio of total liabilities to household disposable income in Japan is 
due entirely to the relatively high ratio of non-housing loans to household disposable 
income. 
 
As for the other G7 countries, they have similar ranks whether one looks at total 
liabilities or mortgages (housing loans), with Canada and the United Kingdom ranking 
relatively high with respect to both, France and Germany ranking relatively low with 
respect to both, and Italy ranking seventh (last) in all years with respect to both. 
 
It is not surprising that the ratio of housing loans to household disposable income is 
high in the United States, where there a number of governmental agencies such as the 
Federal Housing Association (FHA), the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae), and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) whose 
mandate is to increase the supply of housing loans, and in the United Kingdom, where 
there is little intervention in the mortgage market by the state or by state-funded entities 
but where there is intense competition among mutual organizations (building societies 
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and credit unions) and proprietary lenders (typically banks) and little regulation to fetter 
that competition.  
 
Looking next at direct evidence on the importance of non-housing loans, the data in 
Table 1 show that Japan ranked first with respect to the ratio of non-housing loans to 
household disposable income in all seven of the years for which data are shown, with 
this ratio ranging from 46 to 81 percent.   
 
By contrast, the United States ranked between third and sixth, ranked lower than it did 
with respect to the ratio of housing loans to household disposable income in all but one 
year, and ranked below Japan in every year with respect to the ratio of non-housing 
loans to household disposable income, with this ratio ranging from 26 to 34 percent.   
 
As for the remaining countries, the ranks of Canada, Germany, and Italy were roughly 
the same in the case of both housing and non-housing loans, while France and the 
United Kingdom ranked lower with respect to non-housing loans than they did with 
respect to housing loans.   
 
In sum, Japan devotes a relatively high proportion of total consumer credit to 
non-housing loans (more than 50 percent except in 2008), France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States devote a relatively high proportion of total consumer 
credit to housing loans, and Canada and Italy are somewhere in between (but the figures 
for France and Italy could exaggerate the importance of housing loans because all 
long-term loans are assumed to be housing loans in France and all medium- and 
long-term loans in Italy are assumed to be housing loans).  Thus, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, the Japanese were the most prolific borrowers among the G7 
countries, at least until 2000, and they were especially prolific borrowers of 
non-housing loans.  However, it should be noted that non-housing loans include not 
only non-collateralized loans used to finance consumption but also other items such the 
interfirm credit and trade credit of private unincorporated enterprises, which are part of 
the household sector.  It could well be that non-housing loans are relatively more 
important in Japan because interfirm and trade credit are relatively more important, 
which in turn could be because private unincorporated enterprises are relatively more 
prevalent in Japan.  To the extent that private unincorporated enterprises are part of the 
household sector, the fact that their loans are included in household liabilities is not a 
problem, but it should be noted that the data we present exaggerate the importance of 
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non-housing loans if we are interested in salaried worker households only. 
 
B. Data on Household Wealth  
 
The discussion has focused until now on the ratio of indebtedness (liabilities) to 
household disposable income, but this can be a misleading indicator of the financial 
health of households because it does not take account of the opposite side of the 
household balance sheet—namely, household wealth (assets).  A high 
liability-to-income ratio is not necessarily a problem if the household has a considerable 
amount of wealth (assets) (i.e., a high wealth-to-income ratio), and conversely, even a 
low liability-to-income ratio may be problematic if the household has little or no wealth 
(assets) (i.e., a low wealth-to-income ratio).  Thus, I turn next to data on household 
wealth (assets). 
 
Looking at the ratio of total assets (the broadest measure of household assets) to 
household disposable income in Table 1, Japan ranked first with respect to this ratio in 
three out of the seven years for which data are shown, second in two out of the seven 
years, and third in the remaining two years, with this ratio ranging from 581 to 1075 
percent.  Thus, Japan has a relatively high liability-to-income ratio as well as a 
relatively high asset-to-income ratio, so its relatively high liability-to-income ratio is not 
necessarily cause for concern. 
 
By contrast, the ratio of total assets to household disposable income is relatively low in 
the United States, ranking between third and seventh (except in 1980, when it ranked 
first) and ranging from 561 to 765 percent, but the United States is about average with 
respect to the ratio of total liabilities to household disposable income.  Thus, the 
situation in the United States is of more concern than that in Japan but is not necessarily 
cause for grave concern. 
 
Turning to the other G7 countries, Italy and the United Kingdom rank relatively high 
with respect to the ratio of total assets to household disposable income while Canada, 
France, and Germany rank relatively low with respect to this ratio.  Thus, the 
correlation between total liabilities and total assets is high but imperfect, with the 
United Kingdom ranking high with respect to both, France and Germany ranking low 
with respect to both, and Canada ranking high with respect to liabilities and low with 
respect to assets.  It therefore appears that Canadians are the least healthy financially. 
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Turning next to data on net wealth, which take account of assets as well as liabilities and 
is therefore the best indicator of the financial health of households, the ratio of net 
wealth to household disposable income has been relatively high in Japan, ranking 
between first and fourth and ranging from 504 to 943 percent.  This is because 
although the liabilities of Japanese households are relatively high, their assets are also 
relatively high.   
 
By contrast, the ratio of net wealth to household disposable income is below average in 
the United States, ranking between third and seventh (except in 1980, when it ranked 
first) and ranging from 475 to 634 percent.  This is because its asset-to-income ratio is 
below average and its liability-to-income ratio is about average.  These results show 
that the financial position of the Japanese is much healthier than that of Americans and 
are consistent with our earlier findings concerning total assets.  Thus, our results 
suggest that the Japanese are more frugal and healthier financially than Americans and 
that the conventional wisdom is correct after all. 
 
Turning to the other G7 countries, Italy and the United Kingdom rank relatively high 
with respect to the ratio of net wealth to household disposable income while Canada, 
France, and Germany rank relatively low.  These results mirror the results for the 
asset-to-income ratio, which is not surprising because variations in the magnitude of 
assets exceed variations in the magnitude of liabilities.  Canada’s relatively low rank is 
consistent with our earlier finding that Canada ranks high with respect to liabilities but 
low with respect to assets and provides further evidence that the financial health of 
Canadians is not very good. 
 
Turning finally to the share of non-financial (housing) assets in total assets, this share is 
relatively high in France, Germany, and Italy, and relatively low in Canada, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  There does not seem to be much of a 
correlation between the net wealth to income ratio and the share of non-financial 
(housing) assets: some countries with relatively low housing shares (such as Japan and 
the United Kingdom) have relatively high net wealth to income ratios whereas other 
countries with relatively low housing shares (such as Canada and the United States) 
have relatively low net worth to income ratios.  This suggests that portfolio choice 
does not have a significant impact on one’s financial health.   
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III. Long-term Trends over Time in Japan 
 
In this section, I look at long-term trends over time in household assets, liabilities, and 
net worth in Japan, using the OECD data for the 1980-2008 period shown in Table 1 and 
the data for the 1955-1975 period shown in Table 2 and taken from the National 
Accounts (Kokumin Keizai Keisan) of the Economic Research Institute (Keizai 
Kenkyuu-sho) of the former Economic Planning Agency (Keizai Kikaku-chou) of the 
Japanese Government.  (Unfortunately, pre-1980 data are not readily available for the 
other G7 countries.)    
 
As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, the ratio of total liabilities to household disposable 
income was only 23 percent in Japan in 1955 but increased rapidly until 1990 before 
leveling off at the 128-135 percent level.  Thus, the Japanese were not always prolific 
borrowers but rather their propensity to borrow increased sharply over time, at least 
until 1990. 
 
Turning to the asset side, the ratio of total assets to household disposable income was 
only 354 percent in Japan in 1955, increased steadily until 1990, when it peaked at 1075 
percent, and has been fluctuating in the 856 to 882 percent range since then.   
 
Turning finally to net wealth, which takes account of both assets and liabilities and is 
therefore the best indicator of the financial health of households, the ratio of net wealth 
to household disposable income, was only 331 percent in Japan in 1955, increased 
steadily until 1990, when it peaked at 943 percent, and has been fluctuating in the 728 
to 748 percent range since then. 
 
In sum, all three aggregates (the ratios of total liabilities, total assets, and net worth to 
household disposable income) have shown similar trends over time in Japan, increasing 
until 1990 before leveling off.  What happened during the 1955-90 period is that the 
increase in liabilities was more than offset by the increase in assets, as a result of which 
net wealth (the difference between the two) increased.  Thus, the sharp increase in 
liabilities during this 35-year period is not a worrisome or unhealthy trend. 
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IV. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, I conducted an international comparison of the financial health of 
households using data on household wealth and indebtedness for the Group of Seven 
(G7) countries and saw that the conventional wisdom that the Japanese and other Asians 
are penny pinchers and savers and that Americans and other Westerners are spendthrifts 
and borrowers appears at first glance to be mistaken.  The Japanese were the most 
prolific borrowers among the G7 countries, at least until 2000, whereas Americans were 
not unusually prolific borrowers.  However, what matters more than the level of 
liabilities is the level of liabilities relative to the level of assets, and the Japanese rank 
relatively high with respect to both total assets and net wealth (the most comprehensive 
measure of household wealth that takes account of both assets and liabilities and the 
best indicator of the financial health of households), while Americans rank relatively 
low with respect to both.  Thus, the Japanese are more frugal and healthier financially 
than Americans and most other Westerners, and the conventional wisdom is correct after 
all.   
 
However, the difference between Japan and the United States and other Western 
countries could be due to differences in culture or to differences in government policies, 
institutions, and other non-cultural factors.1  For example, the higher level of assets and 
net worth in Japan could be due to the culture of frugality in Japan or to government 
policies such as the availability of tax breaks for saving, government-sponsored saving 
promotion campaigns, and the delay in the development of social safety nets and public 
old-age pensions, institutions such as the large semi-annual bonuses paid to salaried 
workers, demographic factors such as the young age structure of the population, the 
early retirement age, and long life expectancy, and economic factors such as the high 
growth rate and high and rising land and housing prices (see Horioka (1990, 2008) and 
                                                  
1 Bowman’s (2011) finding that black middle-class parents in the United States often influence their 
children’s wealth and asset decision making suggests that culture is an important determinant of 
household wealth and asset accumulation behavior and that it is transmitted intergenerationally.  
Calder (2012), a historian, and Meyer (2012), an anthropologist, argue that household borrowing 
behavior is embedded in culture in the United States and Germany, respectively, but differ with 
respect to the immutability of culture, as discussed later.  Horioka (1990), an economist, discusses 
the evidence on whether or not culture influences household saving behavior in Japan. 
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Garon (1998, 2006, 2011)).  Thus, it is not clear just from looking at the data which is 
the real culprit. 
 
Turning to long-term trends over time in household assets, liabilities, and net worth in 
Japan, I found that Japan has shown a sharp increase over time in household borrowing, 
at least until 2000, and a sharp increase over time in both household assets and 
household net worth, at least until 1990.   
 
Can these trends be explained by the culture of frugality in Japan?  This depends partly 
on whether cultural is immutable or changes over time.  Calder (2012) points out that 
Americans borrowed excessively even in the nineteenth century and argues that the 
American ethos of confidence is not new, that the ethos of thrift was never the only 
game in town, and that culture persists over time.  By contrast, Meyer (2012) suggests 
that the culture of credit in Germany has changed dramatically over time, with debtors 
formerly viewing debts as a means of participating in a network of social obligations 
but with debtors nowadays viewing debt-financed consumption and instant gratification 
of personal desires as integral to notions of social inclusion and self-realization.   
 
If Calder (2012) is right and traditional values change only slowly over time, the 
dramatic changes in household assets, liabilities, and net worth over time in Japan 
suggest that culture is not an important determinant of household behavior. 
 
By contrast, if Meyer (2012) is right and traditional values erode relatively quickly over 
time, due, for example, to internationalization and the infiltration of foreign influences, 
the increase over time in household borrowing can be explained by culture but the 
increase over time in household assets and household net worth cannot.  Moreover, the 
fact that the sharp increase over time in household borrowing was due largely to the 
sharp increase in mortgages (housing loans) suggests that factors relating to housing 
(such as sharply rising land and housing prices, the increased demand for housing 
induced by higher income levels and the rapid urbanization of the population, and the 
increasing availability of mortgages (housing loans)) rather than the erosion of 
traditional values were the primarily cause of this trend.  With respect to the increasing 
availability of housing loans, during the high-growth era of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 
1970s, the Japanese government made a conscious decision to allocate virtually all 
available credit to the business sector to enable it to investment in plant and equipment 
and to expand its productive capacity as rapidly as possible.  However, the former 
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Housing Loan Corporation (Juutaku Kin’yuu Kouko), whose purpose was to make 
low-interest housing loans to low- to middle-income households, was established by the 
Japanese Government in 1950 and gradually increased the supply of housing loans over 
time, with private financial institutions also getting a piece of the action as time went 
on.   
 
Thus, whether traditional values are stable or erode relatively quickly over time, 
long-term trends over time in household assets, liabilities, and net worth in Japan can be 
explained much better by non-cultural factors than by culture.   
 
Looking, finally, at the broader implications of my findings, what do they imply about 
the applicability of the “Anglo-American credit model”?  My analysis found that 
liabilities are only about average in the United States but among the highest in the 
United Kingdom, which constitutes only weak evidence in favor of the conventional 
wisdom that Americans and the British are unusually prolific borrowers.  The fact that 
both total assets and net wealth are relatively low (even though liabilities are relatively 
low) in the United States suggests that the financial position of Americans is indeed 
relatively weak, but the fact that both total assets and net wealth are relatively high in 
the United Kingdom (even though liabilities are relatively high) suggests that the 
financial position of the British is relatively strong.  Moreover, both countries have 
shown dramatic but diametrically opposed changes, with the United States falling from 
first to last with respect to both total assets and net wealth during the 1980–2008 period 
but the United Kingdom rising in the ranks with respect to both during the same period. 
In other words, the financial health of Americans has deteriorated badly whereas the 
financial health of the British has improved markedly.  Thus, the financial positions 
and trends over time of the Americans and British are dissimilar from one another but 
not necessarily from the other G7 countries, suggesting that there is no 
“Anglo-American credit model.” 
 
Is there a better way to categorize the G7 countries?  In my opinion, the best criterion 
to use for doing so is household net wealth (the broadest measure of household wealth 
and the best indicator of the financial health of households).  By this criterion, Italy, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom would end up in the relatively healthy group and 
Canada, France, Germany, and the United States in the relatively unhealthy group.  
However, it should be noted that neither of the two groups is homogenous.  For 
example, Japan and the United Kingdom have relatively high liabilities, while Italy has 
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relative low liabilities, even though they are all in the same (relatively healthy) group.  
Similarly, Canada and the United States have relatively high or average liabilities while 
France and Germany have relatively low liabilities, even though they are all in the same 
(relatively unhealthy) group.  Thus, it can be seen that it is not easy to categorize the 
G7 countries and that each has its own peculiarities.  This finding is not surprising 
because economic behavior is determined by culture, government policies, institutions, 
and a host of other factors. 
 
Turning to the implications of my findings, my finding that households in Canada, 
France, Germany, and the United States are relatively unhealthy financially suggests 
that households in these countries should restrain their consumption and save more and 
that the governments of these countries should consider policies to encourage 
households to restrain their consumption and save more.   
 
Turning finally to the limitations of this research, the fact that the comparison is limited 
to only the G7 countries (only one of which is non-Western) and the fact that the data on 
housing loans are not strictly comparable should be mentioned.  I hope to overcome 
these limitations in my future research by expanding my sample of countries and 
finding more comparable data.   
 
Another limitation of my research is that it did not place household behavior in the 
context of the overall macroeconomy.  Even if the household sector is financially 
healthy, the country as a whole could be financially unhealthy if the other sectors of the 
economy (the government and corporate sectors) are financially unhealthy, and 
conversely, even if the household sector is financially unhealthy, the country as a whole 
could be financially healthy if the other sectors of the economy are financially healthy.  
For example, although Japanese households are relatively healthy financially, the 
government sector is relatively unhealthy financially, showing the largest government 
debt to GDP ratio in the developed world, and thus, the country as a whole is not in very 
good financial health.  To put it another way, it is fortunate that the financial health of 
Japanese households is partly offsetting the financial distress of the government sector 
because the country as a whole would be in even worse financial health otherwise.  
Conversely, the United States is in such bad financial health overall because both the 
household and government sectors are in bad financial health.   
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Country
Canada
Net wealth 405.0 5.5 400.7 4 416.5 7 476.5 6 502.2 7 534.5 7 544.5 6
Net financial wealth 151.0 2 167.2 4 177.5 5 219.0 4 240.1 5 216.5 5 210.5 5
Non-financial assets 254.0 5 233.5 4 239.0 6 257.6 6 262.0 6 318.0 6 333.9 6
Financial assets 238.0 2 243.1 4 270.4 4 322.4 4 352.7 5 345.9 5 352.1 5
of which: Equities 58.0 2 56.3 1 49.6 5 60.5 3 84.3 4 79.4 3 94.3 1
Total assets 492.0 4 476.6 4 509.4 7 580.0 6 614.8 7 663.8 7 686.0 6
Share of non-fin. assets 51.6 5 49.0 5 46.9 6 44.4 5 42.6 6 47.9 5 48.7 5
Liabilities 87.0 1 75.9 4 92.9 3 103.4 3 112.6 4 129.4 4 141.6 2
of which: Mortgages 53.0 1 47.4 3 59.2 3 68.8 2 69.6 3 79.1 3 88.2 3
of which: All other loans 34.0 2 28.5 4 33.7 3 34.6 3 43.0 2 50.2 2 53.3 2
Share of mortgages 60.9 5 62.5 4 63.7 5 66.5 4 61.8 5 61.2 5 62.3 5
France
Net wealth 405.0 5.5 388.3 5 541.8 4 462.7 7 552.5 5 748.2 3 750.1 3
Net financial wealth 85.0 7 98.4 7 169.6 6 154.2 6 205.7 6 200.5 6 185.1 7
Non-financial assets 319.0 3 289.8 3 372.2 5 308.5 4 346.8 5 547.7 1 565.0 2
Financial assets 147.0 6 161.7 6 248.3 5 219.8 7 282.5 6 291.5 6 285.3 7
of which: Equities 21.0 5 43.4 3 114.1 1 53.3 4 83.5 5 77.5 4 64.5 5
Total assets 466.0 6 451.5 5 620.5 4 528.3 7 629.3 6 839.2 4 850.3 4
Share of non.fin. assets 68.5 2 64.2 1 60.0 4 58.4 3 55.1 2 65.3 1 66.5 1
Total liabilities 62.0 4 63.3 5 78.7 5 65.6 6 76.8 6 91.0 6 100.2 6
of which: Long-term loans 40.0 3 42.9 4 53.4 5 49.6 5.5 53.4 6 65.3 5 76.4 4
of which: All other loans 22.0 5 20.4 5 25.3 5 16.0 6 23.4 7 25.7 7 23.8 7
Share of long-term loans 64.5 4 67.8 2 67.9 4 75.6 1 69.6 2 71.8 3 76.3 1
Germany
Net wealth na na na na 535.6 5 497.6 5 536.6 6 581.2 6 628.0 5
Net financial wealth 139.0 3 172.8 3 130.8 7 126.6 7 151.4 7 180.0 7 198.0 6
Non-financial assets na na na na 404.8 3 371.0 3 385.2 4 401.2 4 430.0 4
Financial assets 154.0 5 189.3 5 200.7 7 223.8 6 265.9 7 287.1 7 300.0 6
of which: Equities 7.0 7 13.3 7 11.6 7 41.2 6 75.2 6 71.3 7 72.0 4
Total assets na na na na 605.5 5 594.8 5 651.1 5 688.4 6 730.0 5
Share of non-fin. assets na na na na 66.9 1 62.4 2 59.2 1 58.3 2 58.9 3
Total liabilities 15.0 6 16.5 6 70.0 6 97.2 4 114.5 3 107.2 5 102.0 5
of which: Mortgages 10.0 6 10.4 6 53.6 4 58.7 4 71.7 2 71.0 4 69.2 5
of which: All other loans 5.0 6 6.1 6 16.4 6 38.5 2 42.8 3 36.2 4 32.8 5
Share of mortgages 66.7 2 63.0 3 76.6 1 60.4 5 62.6 4 66.2 4 67.8 4
Italy
Net wealth 498.0 3 324.7 6 636.9 2 703.2 2 762.7 2 833.6 1 863.9 1
Net financial wealth 109.0 6 138.5 6 196.3 4 213.9 5 329.9 4 311.2 3 298.6 2
Non-financial assets 388.0 1 186.2 6 440.5 2 488.5 1 432.8 1 522.4 3 565.4 1
Financial assets 118.0 7 147.8 7 225.4 6 245.5 5 382.7 4 376.4 4 370.7 4
of which: Equities 8.0 6 14.9 6 46.0 6 37.6 7 98.0 3 84.2 2 76.8 3
Total assets 506.0 3 334.0 6 665.9 3 734.0 2 815.5 3 898.7 2 936.0 2
Share of non-fin. assets 76.7 1 55.7 3 66.2 2 66.6 1 53.1 3 58.1 3 60.4 2
Total liabilities 8.0 7 9.2 7 29.1 7 31.6 7 52.8 7 647.6 7 72.1 7
of which: Med./long-term
loans
6.0
7
6.5
7 13.7 7
18.7 7 28.5 7 36.9
7
41.2 7
of which: All other loans 2.0 7 2.7 7 15.4 7 12.9 7 24.3 6 610.7 6 35.2 4
Share of med./long-term loans 75.0 1 70.7 1 47.1 6 59.2 6 53.9 6 5.7 6 57.2 6
Japan
Net wealth 504.0 2 561.9 1 943.2 1 735.8 1 747.7 3 740.4 4 727.8 4
Net financial wealth 124.0 5 164.7 5 261.9 1 281.2 3 335.7 3 397.2 1 383.3 1
Non-financial assets 380.0 2 397.3 1 681.3 1 454.6 2 411.9 2 343.2 5 344.5 5
Financial assets 201.0 3 253.4 3 393.3 1 411.4 1 470.3 2 529.1 1 511.0 1
of which: Equities 24.0 3.5 29.9 4 51.7 4 45.9 5 41.5 7 75.6 6 46.5 7
Total assets 581.0 2 650.7 1 1074.6 1 866.0 1 882.2 2 872.2 3 855.5 3
Share of non-fin. assets 65.4 3 61.1 2 63.4 3 52.5 4 46.7 4 39.3 6 40.3 6
Total liabilities 77.0 2.5 88.8 1 131.5 1 130.2 1 134.6 1 131.9 2 127.7 4
of which: Mortgages 31.0 5 35.6 5 50.7 6 49.6 5.5 61.1 5 64.1 6 64.7 6
of which: All other loans 46.0 1 53.2 1 80.8 1 80.6 1 73.5 1 67.7 1 63.0 1
Share of mortgages 40.3 7 40.1 7 38.6 7 38.1 7 45.4 7 48.6 7 50.7 7
(continued)
2008
Table 1: Household Wealth and Indebtedness in the OECD Countries, 1980-2008
1990 1995 2000 20051980 1985
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Table 1 (continued)
U.K.
Net wealth 431.0 4 491.2 2 611.0 3 568.7 3 768.1 1 827.0 2 759.6 2
Net financial wealth 133.0 4 179.2 2 214.1 3 288.5 2 380.3 1 304.3 4 242.8 4
Non-financial assets 297.0 4 312.0 2 396.9 4 280.1 5 387.8 3 522.7 2 516.8 3
Financial assets 190.0 4 265.0 2 329.9 3 394.8 3 497.4 1 466.6 2 424.3 2
of which: Equities 24.0 3.5 26.7 5 61.2 2 78.3 2 113.6 2 76.0 5 50.1 6
Total assets 487.0 5 577.0 2 726.8 2 674.9 3 885.2 1 989.3 1 941.0 1
Share of non-fin. assets 61.0 4 54.1 4 54.6 5 41.5 6 43.8 5 52.8 4 54.9 4
Total liabilities 57.0 5 85.8 2 115.8 2 106.3 2 117.1 2 162.3 1 181.4 1
of which: Mortgages 33.0 4 52.3 1 81.3 1 78.3 1 85.4 1 121.2 1 137.3 1
of which: All other loans 24.0 4 33.5 2 34.5 2 28.0 5 31.7 5 41.1 3 44.1 3
Share of mortgages 57.9 6 61.0 6 70.2 2 73.7 2 72.9 1 74.7 1 75.7 2
U.S.A.
Net wealth 507.0 1 478.7 3 474.5 6 509.3 4 579.4 4 634.1 5 489.7 7
Net financial wealth 259.0 1 251.9 1 259.0 2 302.0 1 355.5 2 335.3 2 256.7 3
Non-financial assets 248.0 6 226.8 5 215.6 7 207.6 7 223.9 7 298.8 7 233.0 7
Financial assets 336.0 1 332.0 1 345.6 2 395.4 2 456.2 3 466.4 3 388.3 3
of which: Equities 61.0 1 48.2 2 52.1 3 105.1 1 148.9 1 127.6 1 86.3 2
Total assets 584.0 1 558.8 3 561.2 6 603.0 4 680.1 4 765.2 5 621.2 7
Share of non-fin. assets 42.5 6 40.6 6 38.4 7 34.4 7 32.9 7 39.0 7 37.5 7
Total liabilities 77.0 2.5 80.1 3 86.6 4 93.4 5 100.7 5 131.1 3 131.6 3
of which: Mortgages 50.0 2 49.5 2 60.3 2 63.2 3 67.2 4 97.5 2 98.9 2
of which: All other loans 27.0 3 30.6 3 26.3 4 30.2 4 33.4 4 33.6 5 32.7 6
Share of mortgages 64.9 3 61.8 5 69.6 3 67.7 3 66.8 3 74.3 2 75.1 3
Notes: The left-hand figures show the ratio of each category of assets or liabilities (at the end of the year) to  net household disposable income (in
percent).  The figures pertain to the household sector inclusive of non-profit institutions serving households except in the case of Italy.  The right-hand
figures show the rank of each country among the Group of Seven countries.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook,  no. 54 (December 1993), Table A-64, for 1980 data; no. 65 (June 1999), Annex Table 58 of the same source for
1985 data; vol. 2002/2, no. 72 (December 2002), Annex Table 56 of the same source for 1990 data; vol. 2007/2, no. 82 (December 2007), Annex
Table 58 of the same source for 1995 data; and vol. 2009/2, no. 86 (November 2009), Annex Table 58 of the same source for 2000, 2005, and 2008
data.
20081980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Net wealth 330.9 363.6 332.6 398.8 415.4
Net financial wealth 56.9 75.4 77.8 97.1 98.9
Non-financial assets 274.0 288.2 254.8 301.6 316.5
Financial assets 79.6 114.8 131.5 157.2 161.2
of which: Equities 9.5 13.0 14.8 24.0 20.1
Total assets 353.6 403.0 386.3 458.8 477.7
Total liabilities 22.7 39.4 53.7 60.0 62.3
Note: The figures show the ratio of each category of assets and liabilities (at the end of the year)
to net household disposable income (in percent).  The figures for 1955-65 pertain to the
household sector inclusive of private non-profit institutions serving households whereas the
figures for 1970 and 1975 pertain to the household sector exclusive of private non-profit
institutions serving households.
Sources: Economic Research Institute (Keizai Kenkyuu-sho), Economic Planning Agency
(Keizai Kikaku-chou), ed., Report on National Accounts from 1955 to 1969  (Kokumin
Keizai Keisan Houkoku: Chouki Sokyuu Suikei: Shouwa 30-nen--Shouwa 44-nen)
(Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau (Ookura-shou Insatsu-kyoku), 1988) for
1955-65 data; Economic Research Institute (Keizai Kenkyuu-sho), Economic Planning Agency
(Keizai Kikaku-chou), ed.,  Annual Report on National Accounts  (Kokumin Keizai Keisan
Nenpou) , 2000 edition (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau (Ookura-shou
Insatsu-kyoku), 2000) for 1970-75 data.
Table 2: Household Wealth and Indebtedness in Japan, 1955-75
 
